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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION'S
ROLE IN REGULATING
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS"
RODNEY K. SMITH**::
I. INTRODUCTION
As one whose scholarship focuses on religious liberty and sport, I am
often asked why I write in such seemingly disparate areas. My typical
response is that given my interest in the role of religion in society, I
certainly should be interested in sport, the religion of the American peo-
ple. This response invariably engenders a slight smile and chuckle.' I
fear that there is some truth to the statement. Although I do not have
the statistics necessary to prove it, my impression is that as many adults
are zealously devoted to "the game" on any given day as are devoted to
a worship service at a religious institution. As a people, we seem almost
fixated on sport and devote much space in newspapers and newscasts to
sport, with little space being allocated to religion. Yet, the discourse re-
garding sport is generally just description of events occurring, and rarely
peers more deeply into the ramifications of specific issues', or of the
* Presented on January 8, 1999, as part of the Law and Sports Section of the Association
of American Law Schools symposium titled The NCAA's Evolving Role in Governing
Intercollegiate Athletics.
Rodney K. Smith, Herff Chair in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The Uni-
versity of Memphis. Professor Smith has served as a member of the NCAA Infractions Ap-
peals Committee and as a Dean at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, the University of
Montana, and Capital University. The author acknowledges the research assistance of Robert
Walker.
1. I often wonder whether the response is based on a feeling that I have said something
cute, or whether it is founded in a deeper disquietude over the fact that I may just be right.
2. Sports sections are filled with description and occasional polemics over aspects of the
role of sport in society, but that discourse rarely goes beyond the superficial as to specific
issues raised. For example, commentators repeatedly argue that intercollegiate athletes
should be "paid" without discussing in any depth the ramifications of their suggestions on the
athletes and educational institutions. Marty Lang, Pay-For-Play Versus NCAA, at http:Iwww.
linkmag.com/link/FebMar_99/990121ccl-sports.html (Feb.-Mar. 1999). Academics, who un-
derstand the need to study major phenomena that affect our culture in great depth, often shun
the exploration of deeper ethical and moral issues related to sport. For example, once during
lunch with a group of my faculty colleagues, a fellow faculty member asked me what I thought
about "the game" that weekend. I responded that I did not watch the game. Almost aghast,
he wondered out loud, "how can you teach sports law and not watch the game." As academ-
ics, like our journalistic counterparts, we are too often caught up in the anecdotal moment of
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general issue of our virtually thoughtless zeal for sport in contemporary
society. While I find this to be personally troubling, it is just such
thoughtless zeal as to sport, and the desire to see one's team win at virtu-
ally any cost,3 that contributes to the increasing regulation of athletics at
virtually all levels.
Devotees of a given team, including coaches and fans alike, often
strive mightily to find clever ways to unbalance the playing field in their
team's favor through questionable recruiting techniques or other de-
vices. This propensity to seek undue advantages in sport has made regu-
lation of intercollegiate athletics a necessity in order to maintain even a
semblance of a balanced playing field. Each new, creative way of bend-
ing the rules to create an undue advantage has necessarily led to the
development of new rules and regulations.4 In turn, the growth in the
number of rules has required development of an extensive structure to
ensure that the rules are enforced.
In this essay, I will briefly examine the historical development of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter NCAA) and the
regulation of intercollegiate athletics. I will also offer some general com-
ments regarding the history and future of the regulation of intercollegi-
ate athletics.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC AssOCIATION
A. 1840-1910
The need for regulation of intercollegiate athletics in the United
States has existed for at least a century and a half. One of the earliest
interschool athletic events was a highbrow regatta between Harvard and
Yale Universities, which was commercially sponsored by the then power-
"the game," and rarely pause to reflect thoughtfully on the very ramifications of sport in our
society. This is even more true when, as educational institutions, we have made an academic
home for intercollegiate athletics.
3. This is reminiscent, in some ways, of the zeal of some religionists that has led them to
conduct holy wars in order to prove that their religion is superior.
4. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
(2000) [hereinafter MANUAL]. Including the index, the MANUAL is 479 pages long, with small
print. These rules are in large measure a reflection of efforts to curtail the creativity of devo-
tees of a particular team to find ways to gain an advantage over another institution. Each time
a new way of creating an unfair advantage is concocted in the head of a coach or other devo-
tee of a given team, a new rule is spawned to deal with that excess. In turn, as rules prolifer-
ate, an increasingly complex structure for enforcing the rules is necessitated.
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ful Elkins Railroad Line.' Harvard University sought to gain an undue
advantage over its academic rival Yale by obtaining the services of a
coxswain who was not a student.6 Thus, the commercialization and pro-
pensity to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the beginning of
organized intercollegiate athletics in the United States. The problem of
cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the increasing commer-
cialization of sport, was a matter of concern. 7 Initially, these concerns
led institutions to move the athletic teams from student control to
faculty oversight.' Nevertheless, by the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, two leading university presidents were voicing their fears that inter-
collegiate athletics were out of control.9 President Eliot at Harvard was
very concerned about the impact that commercialization of intercollegi-
ate athletics was having, and charged that "lofty gate receipts from col-
lege athletics had turned amateur contests into major commercial
spectacles."'" In the same year, President Walker of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology bemoaned the fact that intercollegiate athletics
had lost its academic moorings and opined that "[i]f the movement shall
continue at the same rate, it will soon be fairly a question whether the
letters B.A. stand more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics.""
In turn, recognizing the difficulty of overseeing intercollegiate athletics
at the institutional level, whether through the faculty or the student gov-
ernance, conferences were being created both to facilitate the playing of
a schedule of games and to provide a modicum of regulation at a
broader level.' 2
5. These regatta, which were student run for the most part, were among the first intercol-
legiate athletic events.
6. Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 988-89 (1987) [hereinafter Smith,
Death Penalty]; Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games With the Re-
form of Big-Time Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567, 569-70 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Little
Ado].
7. The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, with the payment of star athletes,
was rather firmly entrenched by the latter part of the 19th Century. For example, it is re-
ported that Hogan, a successful student-athlete at Yale at that time, was compensated with:
(1) a suite of rooms in the dorm; (2) free meals at the University club; (3) a one-hundred
dollar scholarship; (4) the profits from the sale of programs; (5) an agency arrangement with
the American Tobacco Company, under which he received a commission on cigarettes sold in
New Haven; and (6) a ten-day paid vacation to Cuba. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6,
at 989.
8. Id. at 989-90.
9. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 570.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 990.
20001
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Despite the shift from student control to faculty oversight and some
conference regulation, intercollegiate athletics remained under-regu-
lated and a source of substantial concern.' 3 Rising concerns regarding
the need to control the excesses of intercollegiate athletics were com-
pounded by the fact that in 1905 alone, there were over eighteen deaths
and one hundred major injuries in intercollegiate football. 4 National
attention was turned to intercollegiate athletics when President
Roosevelt called for a White House conference to review football
rules.'5 President Roosevelt invited officials from the major football
programs to participate.' 6 Deaths and injuries in football persisted, how-
ever, and Chancellor Henry MacCracken of New York University called
for a national meeting of representatives of the nation's major intercolle-
giate football programs to determine whether football could be regu-
lated or had to be abolished at the intercollegiate level. 7
Representatives of many major intercollegiate football programs ac-
cepted Chancellor MacCracken's invitation and ultimately formed a
Rules Committee." President Roosevelt then sought to have partici-
pants in the White House conference meet with the new Rules Commit-
tee.19 This combined effort on the part of educators and the White
House eventually led to a concerted effort to reform intercollegiate foot-
ball rules, resulting in the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (hereinafter IAA), with sixty-two original members.20 In 1910,
the IAA was renamed the NCAA.21 Initially, the NCAA was formed to
formulate rules that could be applied to the various intercollegiate
sports.2 2
In the years prior to the formation of the NCAA, schools wrestled
with the same issues that we face today: the extreme pressure to win,
which is compounded by the commercialization of sport, and the need
for regulations and a regulatory body to ensure fairness and safety.' In
terms of regulation, between 1840 and 1910, there was a movement from
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 1 (1986); Smith, Death Penalty, supra
note 6, at 990.
16. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 990.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 991; SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 571.
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loose student control of athletics to faculty oversight, from faculty over-
sight to the creation of conferences, and, ultimately, to the development
of a national entity for governance purposes.24
B. 1910-1970
In its early years, the NCAA did not play a major role in governing
intercollegiate athletics.25 It did begin to stretch beyond merely making
rules for football and other games played, to the creation of a national
championship event in various sports.26 Indeed, students, with some
faculty oversight, continued to be the major force in running intercollegi-
ate athletics.2 7 By the 1920s, however, intercollegiate athletics were
quickly becoming an integral part of higher education in the United
States.28 Public interest in sport at the intercollegiate level, which had
always been high, continued to increase in intensity, particularly as suc-
cessful and entertaining programs developed, and also with increasing
access to higher education on the part of students from all segments of
society.
29
With this growing interest in intercollegiate sports and attendant in-
creases in commercialization, outside attention again focused on govern-
ance and related issues.3" In 1929, the highly respected Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Education issued a significant re-
port regarding intercollegiate athletics and made the following finding:
[A] change of values is needed in a field that is sodden with the
commercial and the material and the vested interests that these
forces have created. Commercialism in college athletics must be
diminished and college sport must rise to a point where it is es-
teemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords to
mature youth.3'
The Carnegie Report, echoing themes that appear ever so relevant in the
year 2000, concluded that college presidents could reclaim the integrity
of sport.32 College administrators "could change the policies permitting
24. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 989-91.
25. Id. at 991.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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commercialized and professionalized athletics that boards of trustees
had previously sanctioned. 33
While the NCAA made some minor attempts to restructure rules to
increase integrity in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, those ef-
forts were insufficient to keep pace with the growing commercialization
of, and interest in, intercollegiate athletics 4.3  Recruitment of athletes
was not new, but the rising desire to win, with all its commercial ramifi-
cations, contributed to recruitment being raised to new heights.3 Red
Grange, for example, is often given credit for "starting the competition
for football talent through.., recruiting."36 Public interest in intercolle-
giate athletics continued to increase with support from the federal gov-
ernment during the 1930s. The capacity of the NCAA to regulate
excesses was not equal to the daunting task presented by the growth of,
interest in, and commercialization of sport.37
After World War II, with a dramatic increase in access to higher edu-
cation on the part of all segments of society, largely through government
support for returning military personnel to attend college, public interest
expanded even more dramatically than it had in the past.3 Increased
interest, not surprisingly, led to even greater commercialization of inter-
collegiate athletics. With the advent of television, the presence of radios
in the vast majority of homes in the United States, and the broadcasting
of major sporting events, these pressures further intensified.39 More col-
leges and universities started athletic programs, while others expanded
existing programs, in an effort to respond to increasing interest in inter-
collegiate athletics. These factors, coupled with a series of gambling
scandals and recruiting excesses, caused the NCAA to promulgate addi-
tional rules, resulting in an expansion of its governance authority.40
In 1948, the NCAA enacted the so-called "Sanity Code," which was
designed to "alleviate the proliferation of exploitive practices in the re-
cruitment of student-athletes."'4 1 To enforce the rules in the Sanity
Code, the NCAA created the Constitutional Compliance Committee to
interpret rules and investigate possible violations.4' Neither the Sanity
33. Id.
34. Id. at 991-92.
35. Id. at 992.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 992.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Code with its rules, nor the Constitutional Compliance Committee with
its enforcement responsibility, were successful because their only sanc-
tion was expulsion, which was so severe that it rendered the Committee
impotent and the rules ineffectual.43 Recognizing this, the NCAA re-
pealed the Sanity Code in 1951, replacing the Constitutional Compliance
Committee with the Committee on Infractions, which was given broader
sanctioning authority.' Thus, in 1951, the NCAA began to exercise
more earnestly the authority which it had been given by its members."5
Two other factors are worth noting in the 1950s: (1) Walter Byers
became Executive Director of the NCAA, and contributed to strength-
ening the NCAA, and its enforcement division, over the coming years to
televise intercollegiate football; and (2) the NCAA negotiated its first
contract valued in excess of one million dollars, opening the door to in-
creasingly lucrative television contracts in the future.46 The NCAA was
entering a new era, in which its enforcement authority had been in-
creased, a strong individual had been hired as executive director, and
revenues from television were beginning to provide it with the where-
withal to strengthen its capacity in enforcing the rules that were being
promulgated. 7 Through the 1950s and 1960s, the NCAA's enforcement
capacity increased annually. 8
C. 1971-1983
By 1971, as its enforcement capacity had grown yearly in response to
new excesses arising from increased interest and commercialization, the
NCAA was beginning to be criticized for alleged unfairness in the exer-
cise of its enhanced enforcement authority.49 Responding to these criti-
cisms, the NCAA formed a committee to study the enforcement process,
and ultimately, in 1973, adopted recommendations developed by that
committee designed to divide the prosecutorial and investigative roles of
the Committee on Infractions."° In the early 1970s, as well, the member-
ship of the NCAA decided to create divisions, whereby schools would be
placed in divisions that would better reflect their competitive capacity.51
43. Id. at 992-93.
44. Id. at 993.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 992.
50. Id. at 994.
51. Id. at 993.
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Despite these efforts, however, by 1976, when the NCAA was given ad-
ditional authority to enforce the rules by penalizing schools directly, and,
as a result, athletes, coaches, and administrators indirectly, criticism of
the NCAA's enforcement authority grew even more widespread." In-
deed, in 1978, the United States House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigation held hearings to investigate the
alleged unfairness of the NCAA's enforcement processes. 3 Once again,
the NCAA responded by adopting changes in its rules designed to ad-
dress many of the criticisms made during the course of the hearings. 54
While concerns were somewhat abated, the NCAA's enforcement
processes continued to be the source of substantial criticism through the
1970s and 1980s. 5
The NCAA found itself caught between two critiques. On the one
hand, it was criticized for responding inadequately to the increased com-
mercialization of intercollegiate athletics, with all its attendant excesses;
while on the other hand, it was criticized for unfairly exercising its regu-
latory authority. 6 Another factor began to have a major impact as well.
University and college presidents were becoming more directly con-
cerned with the operation of the NCAA for two major reasons: (1) as
enrollments were beginning to drop, and expenses were increasing in
athletics and elsewhere, presidents began, with some ambivalence, to see
athletics as an expense, and as a potential revenue and public relations
source; and (2) they personally came to understand that their reputa-
tions as presidents were often tied to the success of the athletic program
and they were, therefore, becoming even more fearful of the NCAA's
enforcement authority.5 7
D. 1984-1999
In difficult economic times for higher education in the 1980s, univer-
sity presidents increasingly found themselves caught between the pres-
sures applied by influential members of boards of trustees and alumni,
who often demanded winning athletic programs, and faculty and educa-
tors, who feared the rising commercialization of athletics and its impact
52. Id. at 994.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 995.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 995-96.
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on academic values.58 Many presidents were determined to take an ac-
tive, collective role in the governance of the NCAA, so they formed the
influential Presidents Commission in response to these pressures. 59 In
1984, the Presidents Commission began to assert its authority, and by
1985, it took dramatic action by exercising their authority to call a spe-
cial convention to be held in June of 1985.60 This quick assertion of
power led one sports writer to conclude that "There is no doubt who is
running college sports. It's the college presidents."'"
The presidents initially were involved in a number of efforts to
change the rules, particularly in the interest of cost containment. 62
These efforts were not all successful.63 Over time, however, the presi-
dents were gaining a better understanding of the workings of the NCAA,
and they were beginning to take far more interest in the actual govern-
ance of intercollegiate athletics.64 A little over a decade later, the presi-
dents' involvement grew to the extent that they had changed the very
governance structure of the NCAA, with the addition of an Executive
Committee and a Board of Directors for the various divisions, both of
which are made up of presidents or chief executive officers.65
In NCAA v. Tarkanian6 6, in a 5-4 decision, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor, freeing the
NCAA from defending against due process allegations brought by
Coach Jerry Tarkanian.67 Despite this victory, concerns persisted re-
garding due process in the NCAA's enforcement processes. In time, the
presidents decided to take action in reforming the enforcement pro-
cess.6" The presidents were involved in forming a Special Committee to
Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process, 69 and sup-
ported the naming of one of their own, President Rex E. Lee of Brigham
58. Id. at 995; Rodney K. Smith, Reforming Intercollegiate Athletics: A Critique of the
Presidents Commission's Role in the N.C.A.A.'s Sixth Special Convention, 64 N.D. L. REv.
423, 427 (1988).
59. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 996-97.
60. Smith, supra note 58, at 428-30.
61. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 997.
62. Smith, supra note 58, at 428.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. MANUAL, supra note 4, at 22-23.
66. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
67. Id. at 199.
68. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssoCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REvIEv THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT AND INFRACTIONS PRO-
CESS, Oct. 28, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
69. The Committee was charged as follows:
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Young University, as Chairman. 7° This distinguished committee, which
included other luminaries such as former Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court Warren E. Burger, issued a report in 1991.71 The
Committee made the following basic recommendations: (1) "Enhance
the adequacy of the initial notice of an impending investigation and as-
sure a personal visit by the enforcement staff with the institution's chief
executive officer; '72 (2) "Establish a 'summary disposition' procedure
for treating major violations at a reasonably early stage in the investiga-
tion;" 73 (3) "Liberalize the use of tape recordings and the availability of
such recordings to involved parties; '74 (4) "Use former judges or other
eminent legal authorities as hearing officers in cases involving major vio-
lations and not resolved in the 'summary disposition' process;"'75 (5)
"Hearings should be open to the greatest extent possible; ' 76 (6) "Pro-
vide transcripts of all infractions hearings to appropriate involved par-
ties;"'77 (7) "Refine and enhance the role of the Committee on
Infractions and establish a limited appellate process beyond that com-
mittee; '78 (8) "Adopt a formal conflict-of-interest policy; '79 (9) "Expand
the public reporting of infractions cases;"80 (10) "Make available a com-
Conduct a thorough review of the enforcement and infractions process, including (a)
the investigation process by the enforcement staff; (b) the function of the Committee
on Infractions, including the hearing process and the method used to determine penal-
ties if guilty, and (c) the release of information to the public regarding sanctions and
the conduct of press conferences at institutions announcing sanctions. The purpose of
the review is to make sure that the process is being handled in the most effective way,
that fair procedures are guaranteed, that penalties are appropriate and consistent; to
determine ways to reduce the time needed to conclude the investigation and the infrac-
tions process, and to determine if there can be innovative changes that will make the
process more positive and understandable to those involved and to the general public.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3. This recommendation certainly reflected a concern on the part of chief execu-
tive officers that they were not sufficiently involved in the enforcement process, when an insti-
tution was being investigated.
73. Id. at 4. Again, in this area, the recommendation called upon the staff to "share with
the chief executive officer its information regarding rules violations" at an early stage. Id. at 5.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 7. This recommendation was adopted, with the creation of the Infractions Ap-
peals Committee, a five-member committee, that hears appeals from the Committee on In-
fractions, and has been developing appellate case law or jurisprudence.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
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pilation of previous committee decisions;""' and (11) "Study the struc-
ture and procedures of the enforcement staff."' 2  These
recommendations have been taken seriously, and, as implemented, are
helping to improve the enforcement processes.
During this time period, there were a number of additional develop-
ments that had an impact on the role of the NCAA in fulilling its en-
forcement and governance of responsibilities. Even in a short history,
like this one, a few of those developments are noteworthy.
As the role of television and the revenue it brings to intercollegiate
athletics has grown in magnitude, the desire for an increasing share of
those dollars has become intense. The first television event in the 1950s
was a college football game, and the televising of college football games
remained under the NCAA's control for a number of years.8 3 In time,
however, a group of powerful intercollegiate football programs were de-
termined to challenge the NCAA's handling of the televising of games
involving their schools.8 4 In NCAA v. Board of Regents85, the United
States Supreme Court held that the NCAA had violated antitrust laws.86
This provided an opening for those schools, and the bowls that would
ultimately court them, to directly reap the revenues from the televising
of their football games.87 This shift has effectively created a new division
in football called the College Football Association, which is made up of
the football powerhouses in Division 1.88 Because these schools have
been able to funnel more television revenues in their direction, which
has led to increases in other forms of revenue, they have gained access to
resources that have unbalanced the playing field in football and other
sports.8 9
Another matter that has dramatically impacted intercollegiate athlet-
ics during the past two decades is Title IX, with its call for gender equity
81. Id. This provision, together with the developing appellate case law, will make for a
jurisprudence of enforcement that will warrant study in the future. It will also help establish
the fairness or equality of treatment that characterizes the rule of law.
82. Id.
83. SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 2.
84. Id.
85. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
86. Id. at 113, 120.
87. SCHUBERT, supra note 15, at 57-58.
88. Id. at 58.
89. It is clear that the membership of the College Football Association has been able to
use those additional revenues to enhance their entire athletics program, giving them a compet-
itive edge.
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in intercollegiate athletics. 90 With some emphasis on proportionality in
opportunities and equity in expenditures for coaches and other purposes
in women's sports, new opportunities have been made available for wo-
men in intercollegiate athletics.91 The cost of these expanded opportuni-
ties have been high, however, particularly given that few institutions
have women's teams that generate sufficient revenue to cover the cost of
these added programs.92 This increase in net expenses has placed signifi-
cant pressure on intercollegiate athletic programs, particularly given that
the presidents are cost-containment conscious, desiring that athletic pro-
grams be self-sufficient.93 Revenue producing male sports, therefore,
have to bear the weight of funding women's sports.94 This, in turn, raises
racial equity concerns because most of the revenue producing male
sports are made up predominantly of male student-athletes of color,95
who are expected to deliver a product that will not only produce suffi-
cient revenue to cover its own expenses, but also a substantial portion of
the costs of gender equity and male sports that are not revenue
producing.96
The gender equity and television issues have been largely economic
in their impact, but they do indirectly impact the role of the NCAA in
governance. Since football funding has been diverted from the NCAA
to the football powerhouses, the NCAA for the most part has had to rely
even more heavily on its revenue from the lucrative television contract
for the Division I basketball championship. 97 Heavy reliance on this
funding source raises racial equity issues, since student-athletes of color,
particularly African-American athletes, are the source of those reve-
nues. 98 Thus, the very governance costs of the NCAA are covered
predominantly by the efforts of these student-athletes of color.99 This
inequity is exacerbated by the fact that schools and conferences rely
heavily on revenues from the basketball tournament to fund their own
institutional and conference needs.' 00
90. Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REv. 329, 367 (1996).
91. Id. at 355.
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id. at 359-60.
94. Id. at 368.
95. Id. at 369-70.
96. Id. at 370.
97. Id. at 348.
98. Id. at 349.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 369-70.
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Generally, developments during the past two decades have focused
on governance and economic issues.101 There have been some efforts,
however, to enhance academic integrity and revitalize the role of faculty
and students in overseeing intercollegiate athletics." 2 Of particular note
in this regard has been the implementation of the certification process
for intercollegiate athletic programs. 3 The certification process in-
volves faculty, students (particularly student-athletes), and staff from an
institution in preparing an in-depth self-study, including substantial insti-
tutional data in the form of required appendices. 0 4 The study covers the
following areas: Governance and Rules Compliance, Academic Integ-
rity, Fiscal Integrity, and Commitment to Equity. 05 This process helps
institutions focus on academic values and related issues.'0 6 These efforts
also provide the chief executive officers with additional information and
a potentially enhanced role in intercollegiate athletics at the campus
level.' 7
The past two decades have been active ones for the NCAA. With
meteoric rises in television and related revenues, the commercialization
of intercollegiate athletics has continued to grow at a pace that places
significant strain on institutions and the NCAA. These commercial pres-
sures, together with increasing costs related to non-revenue producing
sports, costly gender equity requirements, and other resource demands
(e.g., new facilities), make it challenging to maintain a viable enforce-
ment process and a balanced playing field.
III. THE FUrURE
Over the past 150 years, the desire to win at virtually any cost, com-
bined with the increases in public interest in intercollegiate athletics, in a
consumer sense, have led inexorably to a highly commercialized world of
intercollegiate athletics.'0 These factors have created new incentives for
universities and conferences to find new ways to obtain an advantage
over their competitors. This desire to gain an unfair competitive advan-
tage has necessarily led to an expansion in rules and regulations. This
101. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 573.
102. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 1058.
103. This certification process has been in place for a number of years and is becoming
institutionalized. Smith, Little Ado, supra note 6, at 573.
104. Id. at 573-74.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 576.
107. Id.
108. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 6, at 991.
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proliferation of rules and the development of increasingly sophisticated
regulatory systems necessary to enforce those rules, together with the
importance that attaches to enforcement decisions, both economically
and in terms of an institution's reputation (and derivatively its chief ex-
ecutive officer's career), places great strain on the capacity of the NCAA
to govern intercollegiate athletics. This strain is unlikely to dissipate in
the future because the pressures that have created the strain do not ap-
pear to be susceptible, in a practical sense, to amelioration. Indeed, the
one certainty in the future of the NCAA is the likelihood that big-time
intercollegiate athletics will be engaged in the same point-counterpoint
that has characterized its history; increased commercialization and pub-
lic pressure leading to more sophisticated rules and regulatory systems.
As rules and regulatory systems continue along the road of increased
sophistication, the NCAA will more closely resemble its industry coun-
terparts. It will develop an enforcement system that is more legalistic in
its nature, as regulatory proliferation leads to increasing demands for
fairness. In such a milieu, chief executive officers will have to take their
responsibilities for intercollegiate athletics even more seriously.10 9 It can
be hoped, as well, that their involvement, and the increased involvement
on the part of faculty and staff, through the certification process and
otherwise, will lead to a more responsible system in terms of the mainte-
nance of academic values. If the NCAA and those who lead at the insti-
tutional and conference levels are unable to maintain academic values in
the face of economics and related pressures, the government may be less
than a proverbial step away." 0
109. It can be anticipated, as well, that chief executive officers will be held increasingly
accountable for rules violations at their institutions.
110. Just as the government (the legislative and judicial branches) became involved at the
turn of the century and again in the 1970s, it is likely that similar oversight will occur in the
future. With increased formalization of regulatory processes, the judiciary may well become
more involved.
[Vol. 11:9
